In ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., v. COX, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D2029a (Fla. 3d DCA August 22, 2012), the Third District Court of appeals held that the trial court properly awarded injured seaman attorney's
fees pursuant to Florida's offer of judgment statute in his action asserting claims
against cruise line for Jones Act negligence, failure to treat, maintenance and
cure, unearned wages, and unseaworthiness. Given the short length of the opinion, I have copied it in its entirety (less the footnotes).
QUOTE
(LAGOA, J.) Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. (“RCCL”) appeals an
order awarding seaman Byron Cox (“Cox”) attorney's fees pursuant to Florida's
offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1997), following a
jury verdict in his favor in an admiralty case. We are compelled to affirm
based on the authority of Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, 614 So. 2d 517
(Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cox filed the underlying action against RCCL after he
sustained injuries while employed aboard an RCCL vessel. Cox's complaint
asserted claims for Jones Act negligence, failure to treat, maintenance and
cure, unearned wages and unseaworthiness. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.442 and section 768.79, Cox served an offer of judgment on RCCL.
RCCL moved to strike the offer of judgment, arguing that section 768.79 was
inapplicable in this case because it conflicted with federal maritime law. In response,
Cox cited Modesto, 614 So. 2d at 517, which held that there is no conflict
between section 768.79 and federal maritime law. Following trial, the jury
found in favor of Cox and he sought attorney's fees based on the offer of
judgment. The trial court agreed with Cox's position, denied RCCL's motion to
strike, and found that Cox was entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The trial
court awarded Cox $245,856.87 in fees and costs, and this appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
In Modesto, a seaman sought damages under the Jones Act and
general maritime law for injuries he sustained aboard a Royal Caribbean ship.
He filed a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Florida's offer of judgment
statute. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, this Court reversed the
trial court's order, stating that:
[W]e find no conflict between Florida's rules of law
regarding offers of judgment and federal maritime law. In federal admiralty
actions, an award of attorney's fees as a component of maintenance and cure is
traditionally within the equitable jurisdiction of the courts. Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 82 S.Ct. 997, 8 L.Ed. 2d 88 (1962). Awards of
attorney's fees made pursuant to Florida law regarding offers of judgment are
intended to deter unnecessary litigation and encourage the timely settlement of
claims . . . . Because Florida's rules relating to offers of judgment are an
integral part of this state's management of its courts' proceedings and do not
conflict with federal admiralty law, we reverse the order denying attorney's
fees.
Id. at 520; see also Juneau Tanker Corp. v. Sims, 627 So. 2d
1230, 1232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citing Modesto without discussion in support of
reversal of denial of attorney's fees to seaman).
RCCL properly concedes that Modesto governs the precise
issue in this case -- whether attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79 may be
awarded in a maritime case involving a seaman. Here, as in Modesto, a seaman
sought attorney's fees based on an offer of judgment in an action to recover
Jones Act and other damages under maritime law. The trial court was bound by
this Court's precedent and did not err in awarding attorney's fees to Cox, as
this Court has not receded from Modesto en banc nor has the Florida Supreme
Court overruled Modesto. See State v. Washington, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1535 (Fla.
3d DCA June 27, 2012); Ellis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA
1997); Wood v. Fraser, 677 So. 2d 15, 18-19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); see generally
Sys. Components Corp. v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 14 So. 3d 967, 973 n.4 (Fla.
2009) (“[A] trial court may not overrule or recede from the controlling
decision of a district court.”).
RCCL, however, argues that the attorney's fee award should
be reversed based on federal case law holding that the offer of judgment
statute impermissibly conflicts with maritime law, and based on this Court's
case law impliedly receding from Modesto.
We acknowledge that the weight of federal authority supports
RCCL's contention that Modesto was wrongly decided. Those cases hold that
automatic fee-shifting statutes such as Florida's offer of judgment statute may
not be applied in admiralty cases because such state statutes conflict with and
interfere with the uniformity of federal maritime law as to attorney's fees.
See Misener Marine Constr., Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 594 F.3d 832, 841
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3505 (2010); Texas A & M Research
Found. v. Magna Transp. Inc., 338 F.3d 394, 405 (5th Cir. 2003); Narte v. All
Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., 211 F.3d 1274 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion);
Southworth Mach. Co. v. F/V Corey Pride, 994 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1993);
Sosebee v. Roth, 893 F.2d 54, 56-57 (3d Cir. 1990); Garan, Inc. v. M/V Aivik,
907 F. Supp. 397, 400 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Tai-Pan, Inc. v. Keith Marine, Inc.,
1997 WL 714898, at *10 (M.D. Fla. May 13, 1997); Tampa Port Auth. v. M/V
Duchess, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1296-97 (M.D. Fla. 1997), amended, 65 F. Supp. 2d
1299, affirmed, 184 F.3d 822 (11th Cir. 1999) (table).
Furthermore, this Court's case law subsequent to Modesto may
support RCCL's position that this Court “impliedly” receded from Modesto. See
Frango v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 891 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005);
Chapman v. Laitner, 809 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Hilton Oil Transp. v.
Oil Transp. Co., S.A., 659 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
A three-judge panel of this Court, however, cannot
“impliedly” recede from or overrule Modesto. See In re Rule 9.331, 416 So. 2d
1127, 1128 (Fla. 1982) (“We would expect that, in most instances, a three-judge
panel confronted with precedent with which it disagrees will suggest an en banc
hearing.”); Wood, 677 So. 2d at 18 (holding that a three-judge panel would not
have receded from earlier case and would have suggested en banc consideration);
McBride v. State, 604 So. 2d 1291, 1292 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (noting that
there appears to be no authority for a court's departure from an earlier panel
decision “without the intervention of an en banc court”). Thus, even assuming
that the cases previously discussed may appear to have “impliedly” receded from
or overruled Modesto, we remain bound to follow Modesto until this Court
expressly recedes en banc from this precedent. See Kloster Cruise Ltd. v.
Segui, 679 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Langmead v. Admiral Cruises, Inc.,
696 So. 2d 1189, 1191, n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Holding Elec., Inc. v. Roberts,
512 So. 2d 1112, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), quashed on other grounds, 530 So. 2d
301 (Fla. 1988); cf. Hearn Props., Inc. v. Cruce, 20 So. 3d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
(noting that in order to follow earlier supreme court decision district court
must sit en banc to recede from its case law).
Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the order awarding Cox
attorney's fees based on this Court's decision in Modesto.
Affirmed.
__________________UNQUOTE
If you are interested in receiving a complete copy of the decision with full footnotes, please feel free to contact me at mov@chaloslaw.com to seek a copy.
Comments
Post a Comment